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2What do we do
• Assess Middleware: Make cloud/grid software more secure• Train: We teach tutorials for users, developers, sys admins, and managers• Research: Make in-depth assessments more automated and improve quality of automated code analysis
http://www.cs.wisc.edu/mist/papers/VAshort.pdf
3Overview
Thinking like an attacker
Thinking like a programmer/designer
Secure programming techniques
Understanding and using automated assessment tools
Thinking Like an Attacker
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Thinking about an Attack:Owning the Bits
“Dark Arts”and“Defense Against the Dark Arts”
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Learn to Think Like an Attacker
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The Path of an Attack
p = requesttable;
while (p != (struct table *)0)
{
if (p->entrytype == PEER_MEET)
{
found = (!(strcmp (her, p->me)) &&
!(strcmp (me, p->her)));
}
else if (p->entrytype == PUTSERVER)
{







return ((struct table *) 0);
An Exploit through the Eyes of an Attacker
Exploit:– A manipulation of a program’s internal state in a way not anticipated (or desired) by the programmer.
Start at the user’s entry point to the program: the attack surface:– Network input buffer– Field in a form– Line in an input file– Environment variable– Program option– Entry in a database– … Attack surface: the set of points in the program’s interface that can be controlled by the user.
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The Path of an Attack
p = requesttable;
while (p != (struct table *)0)
{
if (p->entrytype == PEER_MEET)
{
found = (!(strcmp (her, p->me)) &&
!(strcmp (me, p->her)));
}
else if (p->entrytype == PUTSERVER)
{







return ((struct table *) 0);
The Path of an Attack
p = requesttable;
while (p != (struct table *)0)
{
if (p->entrytype == PEER_MEET)
{
found = (!(strcmp (buf, p->me)) &&
!(strcmp (me, p->her)));
}
else if (p->entrytype == PUTSERVER)
{







return ((struct table *) 0);
buffer[100]
<ret addr>
The Classic: A Stack Smash
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– Pointers and Strings– Numeric Errors– Exceptions– Injection Attacks– Web Attacks
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Discussion of the Practices





1. Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') 2. Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') 3. Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow') 4. Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') 5. Missing Authentication for Critical Function 6. Missing Authorization 7. Use of Hard-coded Credentials 8. Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data 9. Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type 10. Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision
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Buffer Overflow of User Data Affecting Flow of Control
char id[8];int validId = 0;   /* not valid */
gets(id); /* reads "evillogin"*/
/* validId is now 110 decimal */if (IsValid(id)) validId = 1; /* not true */if (validId)                  /* is true  */{DoPrivilegedOp();}   /* gets executed */
e v i l l o g i 110‘n’ \0 \0 \0
id validId
\0 \0 \0 \0id validId
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Buffer Overflow Danger Signs: Missing Buffer Size
• gets, getpass, getwd, and scanf family (with %s or %[…] specifiers without width)
– Impossible to use correctly: size comes solely from user input– Source of the first (1987) stack smash attack.– Alternatives:
Unsafe Safer
gets(s) fgets(s, sLen, stdin)
getcwd(s) getwd(s, sLen)
scanf("%s", s) scanf("%100s", s)
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strcat, strcpy, sprintf, vsprintf
– Impossible for function to detect overflow• Destination buffer size not passed– Difficult to use safely w/o pre-checks• Checks require destination buffer size• Length of data formatted by printf• Difficult & error prone• Best incorporated in a safe replacement function
Proper usage: concat s1, s2 into dst





Buffer Overflow Danger Signs: Difficult to Use and Truncation
• strncat(dst, src, n)
– n is the maximum number of chars of src to append (trailing null also appended)– can overflow if   n >=(dstSize-strlen(dst))
• strncpy(dst, src, n)
– Writes n chars into dst, if strlen(src)<n, it fills the other n-strlen(src) chars with 0’s– If strlen(src)>=n,  dst is not null terminated• Truncation detection not provided• Deceptively insecure– Feels safer but requires same careful use as strcat
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Buffer Overflow of aUser Pointer
{ char id[8];int (*logFunc)(char*) = MyLogger;
gets(id); /* reads "evilguyx “ */
/* equivalent to system(userMsg) */logFunc(userMsg);







Some people believe that buffer overflows are ancient history  … 
Heartbleed:• Failure of the OpenSSL library to validate the length field (as compared to the size of the actual message).• The heartbeat protocol is supposed to echo back the data sent in the request where the amount is given by the payload length.• Since the length field is not checked, memcpy can read up to 64KB of memory.
 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
Length field. Supplied byan untrusted source.Source. Buffer with t eheartbeat record. Improperly used.
Destination. Allocated, used, and freed.  OK.
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Buffer Overflow
Some people believe that buffer overflows are ancient history  … 
Heartbleed:• Failure of the OpenSSL library to validate the length field (as compared to the size of the actual message).• The heartbeat protocol is supposed to echo back the data sent in the request where the amount is given by the payload length.• Since the length field is not checked, memcpy can read up to 64KB of memory.
… but they would be wrong.
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Buffer Overflow
Validation to remediate Heartbleed
 Read type and payload length
   if ((1+2+payload+16)>InputLength)






This is a classic overflow from OpenSSH 3.3.
nresp = packet_get_int();if (nresp > 0) {response = xmalloc(nresp*sizeof(char*));for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++)response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);} 
From https://www.owasp.org
If nresp has the value 1,073,741,824 (0x40000000) and sizeof(char*) has a value of 4, then the result of the operation:
nresp * sizeof(char*) = 0x100000000
overflows, and the argument to xmalloc() will be 0. 
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Integer Vulnerabilities
Description– Most programming languages allow silent loss of integer data without warning due to:• Overflow• Truncation• Signed vs. unsigned representations– Code may be secure on one platform, but silently vulnerable on another due to different underlying integer types.
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Numeric ParsingUnreported Errors
atoi, atol, atof, scanf family (with %u, %i, %d, %x and %o specifiers)
– Out of range values results in unspecified behavior.– Non-numeric input returns 0.– Use strtol, strtoul, strtoll, strtoull, strtof, strtod, strtold which allow error detection.
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Numeric Error
unchecked to bypass integer overflow control.
const int x = 2147483647;   // Maxint
const int y = 2;
static void UnCheckedMethod() {
 int z=0;
 unchecked {
  z = x * y;
 }





checked for integer overflow control.
const int y = 2;
static void CheckedMethod() {
 int z=0;
 Console.WriteLine(“Enter Integer:");
 int x = int.Parse(Console.ReadLine());
 try {
  z = checked (x * y);
 }
 catch (System.OverflowException e) {
  Console.WriteLine(e.ToString());
 }
 Console.WriteLine(“Checked output value: {0}", z);
}
Integer Mitigations
• Use correct types, before validation.• Validate range of data.• Add code to check for overflow, or use safe integer libraries or large integer libraries.• Not mixing signed and unsigned integers in a computation.• Compiler options for signed integer run-time exceptions, and integer warnings.• Use strtol, strtoul, strtoll, strtoull, strtof, strtod, strtold, which allow error detection.
50
The Cost of Not Checking…4 Jun 1996:
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An unchecked 64 bit floating point number assigned to a 16 bit integer
Cost: Development cost: $7 billionLost rocket and payload $500 million




• Exception are a nonlocal control flow mechanism, usually used to propagate  error conditions in languages such as Java, C#, C++, Python, and Ruby.
try {
// code that generates exception
} catch (Exception e) {
// perform cleanup and error recovery
}• Common Vulnerabilities include:– Ignoring (program terminates)– Suppression (catch, but do not handled)– Information leaks (sensitive information in error messages)
Proper Use of  Exceptions
• Add proper exception handling:– Handle expected exceptions (i.e. check for errors)– Don’t suppress:• Do not catch just to make them go away.• Recover from the error or rethrow exception.– Include top level exception handler to avoid exiting:  catch, log, and restart• Do not disclose sensitive information in messages:– Only report non-sensitive data.– Log sensitive data to secure store, return id of  data.– Don't report unnecessary sensitive internal state:• Stack traces.• Variable values.• Configuration data.
Exception Suppression
1. User sends malicious data
boolean Login(String user, String pwd){boolean loggedIn = true;String realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);try {if (!GetMd5(pwd).equals(realPwd)) { loggedIn = false;}} catch (Exception e) {//this can not happen, ignore
}return loggedIn;}
user=“admin”,pwd=null
2. System grants access Login() returns true
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Unusual or Exceptional Conditions Mitigation
boolean Login(String user, String pwd){boolean loggedIn = true;String realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);try {if (!GetMd5(pwd).equals(realPwd)){ loggedIn = false;}} catch (Exception e) {loggedIn = false;}return loggedIn;}2. System does not grant access Login() returns false
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1. User sends malicious data user=“admin”,pwd=null
Exception Suppression
1. User sends malicious data
bool Login(string user, string pwd){bool loggedIn = true;string realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);try {using (MD5 md5Hash = MD5.Create()){if (!string.Equals(realPwd,md5Hash.ComputeHash(pwd)));               { loggedIn = false;}}} catch (Exception e) {//this can not happen, ignore
}return loggedIn;}
user=“admin”,pwd=null
2. System grants access Login() returns true64
Exception Suppression
1. User sends malicious data
bool Login(string user, string pwd){bool loggedIn = true;string realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);try {using (MD5 md5Hash = MD5.Create()){if (!string.Equals(realPwd,md5Hash.ComputeHash(pwd)));               { loggedIn = false;}}} catch (Exception e) {//this can not happen, ignore
}return loggedIn;}
user=“admin”,pwd=null
2. System grants access Login() returns true65
Unusual or Exceptional Conditions Mitigation
bool Login(string user, string pwd){bool loggedIn = true;string realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);try {using (MD5 md5Hash = MD5.Create()){if (!string.Equals(realPwd,md5Hash.ComputeHash(pwd)));               { loggedIn = false;}}} catch (Exception e) {loggedIn = false;}return loggedIn;}2. System does not grant access Login() returns false66
1. User sends malicious data user=“admin”,pwd=null
Unusual or Exceptional Conditions Mitigation
bool Login(string user, string pwd){bool loggedIn = true;string realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);try {using (MD5 md5Hash = MD5.Create()){if (!string.Equals(realPwd,md5Hash.ComputeHash(pwd)));               { loggedIn = false;}}} catch (Exception e) {loggedIn = false;}return loggedIn;}2. System does not grant access Login() returns false67
1. User sends malicious data user=“admin”,pwd=null
WTMI (Way Too Much Info)
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Login(… user, … pwd)  {try {ValidatePwd(user, pwd);} catch (Exception e) {print("Login failed.\n");print(e + "\n");e.printStackTrace();return;}}
void ValidatePwd(… user, … pwd)throws BadUser, BadPwd  {realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);if (realPwd == null)throw BadUser("user=" + user);if (!pwd.equals(realPwd))throw BadPwd("user=" + user+ " pwd=" + pwd+ " expected=" + realPwd);…
Login failed.BadPwd: user=bob pwd=x expected=passwordBadPwd:at Auth.ValidatePwd (Auth.java:92)at Auth.Login (Auth.java:197)… com.foo.BadFramework(BadFramework.java:71)...
User exists Entered pwd
User's actual password ?!?
(passwords aren't hashed)
Reveals internal structure
(libraries used, call structure, version information)
WTMI (Way Too Much Info)
#!/usr/bin/ruby
def ValidatePwd(user, password)if wrong passwordraise “Bad passwd for user #{user} expected #{password}”endend
def Login(user, password) ValidatePwd(user, password);rescue Exception => eputs “Login failed”puts e.messageputs e.backtrace.inspectend
Login failed.Bad password for user Elisa expected pwd["./test3:4:in `ValidatePwd'", "./test3:8:in `Login'", "./test3:15"] 
User exists User's actual password ?!?
Reveals internal structure
The Right Amount of  Information
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Login {try {ValidatePwd(user, pwd);} catch (Exception e) {logId = LogError(e);  // write exception and return log ID.print("Login failed, username or password is invalid.\n");print("Contact support referencing problem id " + logId+ " if the problem persists");return;   }}
void ValidatePwd(… user, … pwd) throws BadUser, BadPwd  {realPwdHash = GetPwdHashFromDb(user)if (realPwdHash == null)throw BadUser("user=" + HashUser(user));if (!HashPwd(user, pwd).equals(realPwdHash))throw BadPwdExcept("user=" + HashUser(user));…}
Log sensitive information
Generic error message
(id links sensitive information)
User and password are hashed





• Description– A string constructed with user input, that is then interpreted by another function, where the string is not parsed as expected• Command injection (in a shell)• Format string attacks (in printf/scanf)• SQL injection• Cross-site scripting or XSS (in HTML)• General causes– Allowing metacharacters– Not properly neutralizing user data if metacharactersare allowed
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SQL Injections
• User supplied values used in SQL command must be validated, quoted, or prepared statements must be used• Signs of vulnerability– Uses a database mgmt system (DBMS)– Creates SQL statements at run-time– Inserts user supplied data directly into statement without validation
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SQL Injections:attacks and mitigations• Dynamically generated SQL without validation or quoting is vulnerable
$u = " '; drop table t --";
$sth = $dbh->do("select * from t where u = '$u'");
Database sees two statements:
select * from t where u = ' '; drop table t --'• Use prepared statements to mitigate
$sth = $dbh->do("select * from t where u = ?", $u);– SQL statement template and value sent to database– No mismatch between intention and use
Successful SQL Injection Attack
1. User sends malicious data
boolean Login(String user, String pwd)  {boolean loggedIn = false;conn = pool.getConnection( );stmt = conn.createStatement();rs = stmt.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM members"+ "WHERE u='" + user+ "' AND p='" + pwd + "'");if (rs.next())loggedIn = true;}
user="admin"; pwd="'OR 'x'='x"
4. System grants access Login() returns true
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SELECT * FROM members WHERE u='admin' AND p='' OR 'x'='x'2. DB Queried
3. Returns all row of table members
Mitigated SQL Injection Attack
1. User sends malicious data
boolean Login(String user, String pwd)  {boolean loggedIn = false;conn = pool.getConnection( );PreparedStatement pstmt = conn.prepareStatement("SELECT * FROM members WHERE u = ? AND p = ?");pstmt.setString( 1, user);pstmt.setString( 2, pwd);ResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( );if (rs.next())loggedIn = true;}
user="admin"; pwd="' OR 'x'='x"
4. System does not grant access Login() returns false101
SELECT * FROM members WHERE u = ?1 AND p = ?2?1 = "admin" ?2 = "' OR 'x'='x"





• User supplied data used to create a string that is the interpreted by command shell such as /bin/sh• Signs of vulnerability– Use of popen, or system
– exec of a shell such as sh, or csh– Argument injections, allowing arguments to begin with "-" can be dangerous• Usually done to start another program– That has no C API– Out of laziness
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Command Injection Mitigations
• Check user input for metacharacters• Neutralize those that can’t be eliminated or rejected– replace single quotes with the four characters, '\'', and enclose each argument in single quotes• Use fork, drop privileges and exec for more control• Avoid if at all possible• Use C API if possible
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Command Argument Injections
• A string formed from user supplied input that is used as a command line argument  to another executable• Does not attack shell, attacks command line of program started by shell• Need to fully understand command line interface• If value should not be an option– Make sure it doesn't start with a -– Place after an argument of -- if supported
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Perl Command InjectionDanger Signs
• open(F, $filename)
– Filename is a tiny language besides opening• Open files in various modes• Can start programs
•dup file descriptors– If $filename is "rm -rf /|", you probably won’t like the result– Use separate mode version of open to eliminate vulnerability
108
Perl Command InjectionDanger Signs• Vulnerable to shell interpretationopen(C, "$cmd|") open(C, "-|", $cmd)open(C, "|$cmd") open(C, "|-", $cmd)`$cmd` qx/$cmd/
system($cmd)• Safe from shell interpretationopen(C, "-|", @argList)open(C, "|-", @cmdList)
system(@argList)
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Perl Command Injection Examples
• open(CMD, "|/bin/mail -s $sub $to");– Bad if $to is "badguy@evil.com; rm -rf /"
• open(CMD, “|/bin/mail -s '$sub' '$to'");– Bad if $to is "badguy@evil.com'; rm -rf /'"
• ($qSub = $sub) =~ s/'/'\\''/g;($qTo = $to)   =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
open(CMD, "|/bin/mail -s '$qSub' '$qTo'");
– Safe from command injection
• open(cmd, "|-", "/bin/mail", "-s", $sub, $to);
– Safe and simpler: use this whenever possible.
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Eval Injections
• A string formed from user supplied input that is used as an argument that is interpreted by the language running the code• Usually allowed in scripting languages such as Perl, sh and SQL
• In Perl eval($s) and s/$pat/$replace/ee
– $s and $replace are evaluated as perl code
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Ruby Command InjectionDanger Signs
Functions prone to injection attacks:• Kernel.system(os command)• Kernel.exec(os command)• `os command` # back tick operator• %x[os command]• eval(ruby code)
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Python Command InjectionDanger Signs
Functions prone to injection attacks:• exec() # dynamic execution of Python code• eval() # returns the value of an expression or    #  code object• os.system() # execute a command in a subshell• os.popen() # open a pipe to/from a command• execfile() # reads & executes Python script from # a file.• input() # equivalent to eval(raw_input())• compile() # compile the source string into a code #  object that can be executed
Successful OS Injection Attack
1. User sends malicious data
3. System executes nslookup x.com;rm –rf /*
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String rDomainName(String hostname)  {…String cmd = "/usr/bin/nslookup " + hostname;Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);…
hostname="x.com;rm –rf /*"
2. Application uses nslookup to get DNS records
4. All files possible are deleted
Mitigated OS Injection Attack
3. System returns error "Invalid host name"
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String rDomainName(String hostname)  {…if (hostname.matches("[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9.-]*")) {String cmd = "/usr/bin/nslookup " + hostname);Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);} else {System.out.println(“Invalid host name”);…
1. User sends malicious data
hostname="x.com;rm –rf /*"
2. Application uses nslookup only if input validates
Code Injection




%data = ReadLogFile('logfile');PH = open("|/usr/bin/python");print PH "import LogIt\n";wwhile (($k, $v) = (each %data)) {if ($k eq 'name')  {print PH "LogIt.Name('$v')";}
2. Perl log processing code – uses Python to do real work
name = John Smith
name = ');import os;os.system('evilprog');#




3. Python source executed – 2nd LogIt executes arbitrary code




%data = ReadLogFile('logfile');PH = open("|/usr/bin/python");print PH "import LogIt\n";wwhile (($k, $v) = (each %data)) {if ($k eq 'name')  {$q = QuotePyString($v);print PH "LogIt.Name($q)";}
2. Perl log processing code – use QuotePyString to safely create string literal
name = John Smith
name = ');import os;os.system('evilprog');#




3. Python source executed – 2nd LogIt is now safe
sub QuotePyString {my $s = shift;
$s =~ s/\\/\\\\/g;   # \  \\










Config file for .NET
XHTML file
WSDL   (web servicesdescription language)
RSS (rich site summary)
SVG (scalable vector graphics)
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XML Injection






Two kinds of attacks:
• XML Bombs.Block of XML that is valid, but crashes the program that attempts to parse it.




• Block of XML that is both well-formed and valid.• Crashes or hangs a program when that program attempts to parse it.  • Example: the Billion Laughs Attack:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
  <!ENTITY lol "lol">
  <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
  <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
  <!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;">
  <!ENTITY lol5 "&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;">
  <!ENTITY lol6 "&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;">
  <!ENTITY lol7 "&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;">
  <!ENTITY lol8 "&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;">
  <!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>




• Block of XML that is both well-formed and valid.• Crashes or hangs a program when that program attempts to parse it.  • Example: the Billion Laughs Attack:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
  <!ENTITY lol "lol">
  <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
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• Block of XML that is both well-formed and valid.• Crashes or hangs a program when that program attempts to parse it.  • Example: the Billion Laughs Attack:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
  <!ENTITY lol "lol">
  <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
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• Block of XML that is both well-formed and valid.• Crashes or hangs a program when that program attempts to parse it.  • Example: the Billion Laughs Attack:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
  <!ENTITY lol "lol">
  <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
  <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
  <!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;">
  <!ENTITY lol5 "&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;">
  <!ENTITY lol6 "&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;">
  <!ENTITY lol7 "&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;">
  <!ENTITY lol8 "&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;">
  <!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>                            http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/ee335713.aspx
Expansion:  A billion “lol”salmost 3GB of  memory!
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XML Bombs
XML bomb– Quadratic Blowup Attack:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE kaboom [






• XML bomb attack payload slightly over 200 KB• Expands to 2.5 GB when parsed
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Mitigated XML Bombs
• Disable inline expansion of entities.• If that is not possible, limit the size of expanded entities.
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Mitigated XML Bombs
Examples in .NET 4.0:Disable inline DTDs
XmlReaderSettings settings = new XmlReaderSettings();              
settings.DtdProcessing = DtdProcessing.Prohibit; 
XmlReader reader = XmlReader.Create(stream, settings);
Limit the size of expanded entities
XmlReaderSettings settings = new XmlReaderSettings();    
settings.ProhibitDtd = false;  
settings.MaxCharactersFromEntities = 1024; 
XmlReader reader = XmlReader.Create(stream, settings);
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Mitigated XML Bombs
Example in Ruby:Disable entity expansion (and limit the size of expanded entities):Disable entity expansion in Ruby’s REXML documentparser.
REXML::Document.entity_expansion_limit = 0 
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XML External Entity (XXE) Attack




• This may lead to the disclosure of confidential data, denial of service, port scanning on the machine where the parser is located.
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XML External Entity (XXE) Attack
• An XML input containing a reference to an external entity is processed by a weakly configured XML parser.• Entity replacement values are pulled from external URIs.
my program
XML parsermaliciousURI
• This may lead to the disclosure of confidential data, denial of service, port scanning on the machine where the parser is located.
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XML External Entity (XXE) Attack
Accessing a local resource that may not return:
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///dev/random" >
Disclosing sensitive information:
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >
XML External Entity (XXE) Attack
Attacker controlled server can cause a DoS:
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://www.attacker.com/dos.ashx" >
public void ProcessRequest(HttpContext context) { context.Response.ContentType = "text/plain"; 
byte[] data = new byte[1000000]; 
for (int i = 0; i<data.Length; i++)  
data[i] = (byte)’A’; 






Mitigated XML External Entity(XXE) Attacks
• Configure the XML parser to avoid resolving external references• If not possible, must modify the XML parser:– Timeout to prevent infinite delay attacks.– Limit the amount of data to be retrieved.– Restrict the XmlResolver from retrieving resources on the local host.
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Mitigated XML External Entity(XXE) Attacks
Example of configuring the XML parser toavoid resolving external references In .NET 4.0:
XmlReaderSettings settings = new XmlReaderSettings(); settings.XmlResolver = null; 
XmlReader reader = XmlReader.Create(stream, settings);





Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
• Injection into an HTML page– HTML tags– JavaScript code• Reflected (from URL) orpersistent (stored from prior attacker visit)• Web application fails to neutralize special characters in user supplied data• Mitigate by preventing or encoding/escaping special characters• Special characters and encoding depends on context– HTML text– HTML tag attribute– HTML URL
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Reflected Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
•••
String query = request.getParameter("q");
if (query != null) {










3. Generated HTML displayed by browser
1. Browser sends request to web server
2. Web server code handles request
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Reflected Cross Site Scripting (XSS)   
•••
String query = request.getParameter("q");
if (query != null) {










3. Generated HTML displayed by browser
1. Browser sends request to web server
2. Web server code handles request
•••
String query = request.getParameter("q");
if (query != null) {
if (query.matches("^\\w*$"))  {
out.writeln("You searched for:\n" + query);












3. Generated HTML displayed by browser
1. Browser sends request to web server
2. Web server code correctly handles request
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Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
• CSRF is when loading a web pages causes a malicious request to another server• Requests made using URLs or forms (also transmits any cookies for the site, such as session or auth cookies)– http://bank.com/xfer?amt=1000&toAcct=joe HTTP GET method
– <form action=/xfer method=POST> HTTP POST method<input type=text name=amt><input type=text name=toAcct></form>• Web application fails to distinguish between a user initiated request and an attack• Mitigate by using a large random nonce
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Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
0. User has a session already open with their bank.1. User loads bad page from web server– XSS – Fake server– Bad guy’s server – Compromised server2. Web browser makes a request to the victim web server directed by bad page– Tags such as <img src=‘http://bank.com/xfer?amt=1000&toAcct=evil37’>– JavaScript3. Victim web server processes request and assumes request from browser is valid– Session IDs in cookies are automatically sent along
SSL does not help – channel security is not an issue here
Successful CSRF Attack
•••
String id = response.getCookie(“user”);
userAcct = GetAcct(id);









2. evil.com returns HTML
3. Browser sends attack
4. bank.com server code handles request
http://evil.com
1. User visits evil.com
•••
String nonce = (String)session.getAttribute(“nonce”);
String id = response.getCookie(“user”);
if (Utils.isEmpty(nonce)
|| !nonce.equals(getParameter(“nonce”)  {
Login(); // no nonce or bad nonce, force login
return;   //    do NOT perform request
}             // nonce added to all URLs and forms
userAcct = GetAcct(id);




2. evil.com returns HTML
3. Browser sends attack 4. bank.com server code correctly handles request
1. User visits evil.com Very unlikely attacker will provide correct nonce 
Session Hijacking
• Session IDs identify a user’s session in web applications.• Obtaining the session ID allows impersonation• Attack vectors:– Intercept the traffic that contains the ID value– Guess a valid ID value (weak randomness)– Discover other logic flaws in the sessions handling process
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Good Session ID Properties
• Hard to guess
– Large entropy (big random number)





• Create new session id after– Authentication– switching encryption on– other attributes indicate a host change (IP address change)• Encrypt to prevent obtaining session ID through eavesdropping • Expire IDs after short inactivity to limit exposure of guessing or reuse of illicitly obtained IDs• Entropy should be large to prevent guessing• Invalidate session IDs on logout and provide logout functionality
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Session Hijacking Example
1. An insecure web application accepts and reuses a session ID supplied to a login page.2. Attacker tricked user visits the web site using attacker chosen session ID3. User logs in to the application4. Application creates a session using attacker supplied session ID to identify the user5. The attacker uses session ID to impersonate the user
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Successful Hijacking Attack
1. Tricks user to visit
if(HttpServletRequest.getRequestedSessionId() == null) { HttpServletRequest.getSession(true);}...
http://bank.com/login;JSESSIONID=123





2. User Logs In
http://bank.com/home
Cookie: JSESSIONID=123
4. Impersonates the user
153
Mitigated Hijacking Attack
1. Tricks user to visit
HttpServletRequest.invalidate();HttpServletRequest.getSession(true);...
http://bank.com/login;JSESSIONID=123




2. User Logs In
4. Impersonates the user
http://bank.com/home
Cookie: JSESSIONID=123
Open Redirect(AKA: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site, and Unsafe URL Redirection)
• Description– Web app redirects user to malicious site chosen by attacker• URL parameter (reflected)http://bank.com/redir?url=http://evil.com• Previously stored in a database (persistent)– User may think they are still at safe site– Web app uses user supplied data in redirect URL• Mitigations– Use white list of tokens that map to acceptable redirect URLs– Present URL and require explicit click to navigate to user supplied URLs
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Open Redirect Example
1. User receives phishing e-mail with URL
http://www.bank.com/redir?url=http://evil.com2. User inspects URL, finds hostname valid for their bank3. User clicks on URL4. Bank’s web server returns a HTTP redirect response to malicious site5. User’s web browser loads the malicious site that looks identical to the legitimate one6. Attacker harvests user’s credentials or other information
155
Successful Open Redirect Attack
String url = request.getParameter("url");if (url != null)  { response.sendRedirect( url );}
http://bank.com/redir?url=http://evil.com2. Opens 
3. Web server redirects Location: http://evil.com
5. Browser displays forgery <h1>Welcome to bank.com<h1>Please enter your PIN ID:
<from action="login">
•••
4. Browser requests http://evil.com
Dear bank.com costumer,
Because of unusual number of invalid login attempts...
<a href="http://bank.com/redir?url=http://evil.com">
Sign in to verify</a>




3. bank.com server code correctly handles request
boolean isValidRedirect(String url) {List<String> validUrls = new ArrayList<String>();validUrls.add("index");validUrls.add("login");return (url != null && validUrls.contains(url));}




1. User receives phishing e-mail
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Let the Compiler Help
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21. What You Need to Know about How Tools Work
2. The Tools And Their Use
3Source Code Analysis Tools
p = requesttable;
while (p != (struct table *)0)
{
if (p->entrytype == PEER_MEET)
{
found = (!(strcmp (her, p->me)) &&
!(strcmp (me, p->her)));
}
else if (p->entrytype == PUTSERVR)
{







return ((struct table *) 0);
4A Bit of HistoryCompiler warnings
5A Bit of History
• Lint  (1979)– C program checker.– Detects suspicious constructs:• Variables being used before being set.• Division by zero.• Conditions that are constant.• Calculations whose result is likely to overflow.• Current automated assessment tools are a sort of “super-Lint”.
6Source Code Analysis Tools• Designed to analyze source code or binaries to help find security flaws.• The source code may contain inadvertent or deliberate weaknesses that could lead to security vulnerabilities in the executable versions of the application program.• Better to use them from the beginning of the software development life cycle.– Though commonly applied to legacy code.
7Source Code Analysis Tools
• Program that parses and then analyses the source code.• Doesn’t know what the program is supposed to do.• Looks for violations of good programming practices.• Looks for specific programming errors.• Works like a compiler– Instead of binaries, it produces an intermediate representation 
8Source Code Analysis Tools





9Source Code Analysis Tools
Different kind of tools:Syntax vs. semantics InterproceduralWhole program analysisLocal vs. pathsData flow analysisSound vs. approximate Implications:ScalabilityAccuracy
10
Different kind of tools
execl (cmd, NULL);  
Pattern (syntax) matching
Semantic analysis





Different kind of tools
execl (cmd, NULL);  
Pattern (syntax) matching
Semantic analysis









Different kind of tools




Source Code Analysis ToolsHow do they work
Identify the code to be analyzed.– Scripts or build systems that build the executable.The parser interprets the source code in the same way that a compiler does.
14
Source Code Analysis ToolsHow do they work
Each invocation of the tool creates a model of the program:– Abstract representations of the source• Control-flow graph• Call graph• Information about symbols (variables and type names)
15
Source Code Analysis ToolsHow do they workSymbolic execution on the model:– Abstract values for variables.– Explores paths.– Based on abstract interpretation and model checking.– The analysis is path sensitive.• The tool can tell the path for the flow to appear.• Points along that path where relevant transformations occur and conditions on the data values that must hold.
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Source Code Analysis ToolsHow do they work
The tool issue a set of warnings.– List with priority levels.The user goes through the warning list and labels each warning as:– True positive.– False Positive.– Don’t care.
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Source Code Analysis Tools The Output
A tool grades weaknesses according things such asseverity,potential for exploit, orcertainty that they are vulnerabilities. Problems:– False positives.– False negatives.
18
Source Code Analysis ToolsThe Output
Ultimately people must analyze the tool’s report and the code then decide: – Which reported items are not true weaknesses. – Which items are acceptable risks and will not be mitigated.– Which items to mitigate, and how to mitigate them. 
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Source Code Analysis Tool LimitationsNo single tool can find every possible weaknesses:– A weakness may result in a vulnerability in one environment but not in another.– No algorithm can correctly decide in every case whether or not a piece of code has a property, such as a weakness.– Practical analysis algorithms have limits because of performance, approximations, and intellectual investment.– And new exploits are invented and new vulnerabilities discovered all the time!
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Source Code Analysis ToolsWhat can they find
• Stylistic programming rules.• Type discrepancies.• Null-pointer dereferences.• Buffer overflows.• Race conditions.• Resource leaks.• SQL Injection.
21
Source Code Analysis ToolsWhat is difficult to find
• Authentication problems.– Ex: Use of non-robust passwords.• Access control issues.– Ex: ACL that does not implement the principle of least privilege.• Insecure use of cryptography.– Ex:  Use of a weak key.
22
Source Code Analysis ToolsWhat is not possible to find
• Incorrect design.• Code that incorrectly implements the design.• Configuration issues, since they are not represented in the code.• Complex weaknesses involving multiple software components.
23
Code Analysis Basics
Control flow analysis– Analyze code structure and build a graph representation.– Basics blocks and branch/call edges.– Pointers are difficult.Data flow analysis– Usage, calculation, and setting of variables.– Extract symbolic expressions.– Arrays are annoying.– Pointers are difficult.
24
Control Flow Analysis
Control Flow AnalysisDetects control flow dependencies among different instructions.Control Flow Graph (CFG)– Abstract representation of the source code.– Each node represents a basic block.– Call or jump targets start a basic block.– Jumps end a basic block.– Directed edges represent the control flow.
void foo() {char buf[MAX] = "example"; int i, j, k;char a, b;char *p = buf;
i = 0;if (c)j = i;elsej = MAX;a = buf[i];b = buf[j];k = 0;while (k < MAX) {if (buf[k]== ′x′)print(k);if (*p == ′z′)print(p);p++;k++;  }}
void foo() {char buf[MAX] = "example"; int i, j, k;char a, b;char *p = buf;
i = 0;if (c)j = i;elsej = MAX;a = buf[i];b = buf[j];k = 0;while (k < MAX) {if (buf[k]== ′x′)print(k);if (*p == ′z′)print(p);p++;k++;  }}
p=bufi=0if (c)
void foo() {char buf[MAX] = "example"; int i, j, k;char a, b;char *p = buf;




void foo() {char buf[MAX] = "example"; int i, j, k;char a, b;char *p = buf;





void foo() {char buf[MAX] = "example"; int i, j, k;char a, b;char *p = buf;









void foo() {char buf[MAX] = "example"; int i, j, k;char a, b;char *p = buf;















Goal:  Is this code safe?Subgoal: Do we ever violate the borders of buf?

































































































































Source Code Analysis Tools.What is expensive to find
It’s difficult for a tool to explore all the paths.– Loops handled considering a small fixed number of iterations.– Most tools ignore concurrency.– Many tools ignore recursive calls.– Many tools struggle with calls made through function pointers.
41
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
• “CWE provides a unified, measurable set of software weaknesses”. • “Allows a more effective use of software security tools”.• 719 weaknesses in 244 categories.• Id, description, consequences, examples, relationship, taxonomy mapping.http://cwe.mitre.org/
42
Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS)
• It “provides a mechanism for prioritizing software weaknesses in a consistent, flexible, open manner”. • Based on three metric groups:– Base finding metric group.– Attack surface metric group.– Environmental metric group.
43











1. What You Need to Know about How Tools Work
2. The Tools And Their Use
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Roadmap
• Motivation• Source code examples• Tools for C/C++ applied to the source code• Tools for Java applied to the source code• The SWAMP
47
What and Why
• Learn about different automated tools for vulnerability assessment.• Start with small programs with weaknesses.• Apply  different tools to the programs.• Understand the output, and strong and weak points of using specific tools.
CWE 78: OS Command Injection
1. void CWE78_OS_Command_Injection__char_console_execl_41_bad(){
2. char *data; char dataBuffer[100] = ""; 
3. data = dataBuffer; 
4. /* Read input from the console */
5. size_t dataLen = strlen(data);
6. /* If there is room in data, read into it from the cons */
7. if (100-dataLen > 1)  {
8. /* POTENTIAL FLAW: Read data from the console */
9. if (fgets(data+dataLen,(int)(100-dataLen),stdin)!= NULL)
10. {
11. /* Remove the carriage return from the string */         
12. dataLen = strlen(data);
13. if (dataLen > 0 && data[dataLen-1] == '\n')
14. data[dataLen-1] = '\0';
15. else {
16. printf("fgets() failed\n");
17. data[dataLen] = '\0';
18. }





How to Describe a Weakness
Descriptive name of weakness (CWE XX)An intuitive summary of the weakness.– Attack point: How does the attacker affect the program.– Impact point: Where in the program does the bad thing actually happen.– Mitigation: A version of the program that does not contain the weakness.
(CWEXX_Long_Detailed_File_Name_Containg_The_Code_yy.cpp)
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OS Command Injection (CWE 78)
User supplied data is used to create a string that will be interpreted by a command shell.– Attack Point: Input read from the console.– Impact Point: Executing command withsystem().– Mitigation: Don’t execute user provided input; instead use a fixed string.
CWE78_OS_Command_Injection__char_console_execl_41.c(Highly modified to compensate for errors.)
51
Tools for C/C++





• Commercial tool by Red Lizard Software available at redlizards.com• The Goanna suite of static analysis tools pinpoints defects and vulnerabilities in C/C++ programs. – Access violations– Memory leaks– Array and string overruns– Division by zero– Unspecified, non-portable, and/or dangerous     constructs – Security vulnerabilities
54
Goanna
1. Download Goanna Central2. Activate the license and install the software
./install-goanna3. Include in PATH the location of goanna/bin.4. Initialize goanna for the project
goanna-init3. Enable the security package: 




Three-step process:– Run a full build of your program using the Goanna build integration utility to capture settings of the build.
$goanna-trace make– Use this information from full build to run analysis.
$goanna-analyze– Produce an analysis report
$goanna-report– Read and interact with the analysis results.• After goreporter is running, load the provided URL in a web browser.
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Goanna. OS Command Injection
$ goanna-trace make
$ goanna–analyze
$ goanna–report• 0 false positive.• 0 false negative.• 1 true positive:  It detects the command injection.
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Goanna. OS Command Injection
58





• Commercial tool. Available at http://www.coverity.com/• Starting Point:  Accurate Compilation.• Depth and Accuracy of Analysis– Interprocedural Dataflow Analysis.– False Path Pruning.– Design Pattern Intelligence.– Enterprise Framework Analyzer.– White Box Fuzzer.• Scalable.
61
Coverity
1. Download the license and the software: https://coverity.secure.force.com/apex/LicenseManagement22. Run the installation script: cov-analysis-linux64-7.6.0.sh3. Include in PATH the location of ~elisa/cov-analysis-linux64-7.6.0/bin4. Command line and graphic interface.
62
CoveritySteps:– Generate a configuration for the compiler:  cov-configure –-gcc– Build the intermediate representation of the source code:  cov-build --dir <intermediate-dir> make
– cov-analyze --dir <intermediate-dir> – Check the checkers included by cov-analize:cov-analyze –-list-checkers– Read and interact with the analysis results.– Graphic mode:  cov-wizard
63
Coverity. OS Command Injection
$ cov-build –-dir cov-comm-injection make
$ cov-analyze –-dir cov-comm-injection–-security• 1 defect found.• 1 true positive:  It detects the command injection.
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Coverity. OS Command Injection
65
Coverity. OS Command Injection
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Coverity. OS Command Injection
67
Coverity. OS Command Injection
68
Coverity. OS Command Injection
69
Coverity. OS Command Injection
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Coverity. OS Command Injection
71




CWE 601: Open Redirect
public void doGet(HttpServletRequest request,
1. HttpServletResponse response)
2. throws ServletException, IOException {
3. response.setContentType("text/html");






10. data = ""; // initialize data in case there are no cookies.
11. // Read data from cookies.
12. Cookie cookieSources[] = request.getCookies();
13. if (cookieSources != null) 
14. // POTENTIAL FLAW: Read data from the first cookie value.
15. data = cookieSources[0].getValue();
16. if (data != null) {
17. URI uri;
18. uri = new URI(data);






Open Redirect (CWE 601)









• Open source tool available at findbugs.sourceforge.net/downloads.html• Uses static analysis to look for bugs in Java code.• Need to be used with the FindSecurityBugs plugin.• Installation:  Easy and fast.
78
FindBugs1. Define FINDBUGS_HOME in the environment.2. Install the Find Security Bugs plugin.3. Learn the command line instructions and also use the graphical interface.4. Command line interface:











• Commercial tool available at http://www.parasoft.com/product/jtest/• Automates a broad range of practices proven to improve development team productivity and software quality.• Standalone Linux 9.5 version used.– gui mode and command line mode.• Installation process:  Slow download & easy installation.
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Jtest
1. Include /u/e/l/elisa/Jtest/9.5 in path.2. Include the license.3. Learn the command line instructions and also use the graphical interface.
84
Jtest
1. Command line interface: $jtestcli<options>2. Graphic Interface: jtest&3. Create a project and copy the .java files to the project/src directory.4. Different tests available.  We chose Security->CWE Top 25.
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Jtest. Open Redirect
Create the OpenRedir project.Include servlet-api.jar in the OpenRedir project.
cp OpenRedirect.java ~elisa/parasoft/workspace1/OpenRedir/src• 4 issues detected:
– getCookies() returns tainted data.









• What is the SWAMP?• Using the SWAMP– Register– Create a project– Upload your software package– Run your assessment– View the results• Java• C/C++
https://continuousassurance.org/swamp/SWAMP-User-Manual.pdf
90
Getting Started with the SWAMP
• Software Assurance Market Place.• Objective: Automate and simplify the use of (multiple) tools.• A national, no-cost resource for software assurance (SwA) technologies used across research institutions, non-governmental organizations, and civilian agencies and their communities as both a research platform and a core component of the software development life cycle.
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Register to use the SWAMP
92
















My Results for Java: Jtest –J Open Redir - Native
101
My Results for Java: Jtest –J Open Redir - CodeDx
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My Results for Java: Jtest –J Open Redir - CodeDx
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My Results for Java: Jtest –J Open Redir - CodeDx
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CWE 601: Open Redirect
public void doGet(HttpServletRequest request,
1. HttpServletResponse response)
2. throws ServletException, IOException {
3. response.setContentType("text/html");






10. data = ""; // initialize data in case there are no cookies.
11. // Read data from cookies.
12. Cookie cookieSources[] = request.getCookies();
13. if (cookieSources != null) 
14. // POTENTIAL FLAW: Read data from the first cookie value.
15. data = cookieSources[0].getValue();
16. if (data != null) {
17. URI uri;
18. uri = new URI(data);






Open Redirect (CWE 601)
Web app redirects user to malicious site chosen by an attacker.– Attack Point: Reading data from the firstcookie using getCookies().– Impact Point: SendRedirect() uses usersupplied data.– GoodSource: Use a hard-coded string.
CWE601_Open_Redirect__Servlet_getCookies_Servlet_01.javaIt’s a Servlet
106
Questions?
Barton P. Miller
bart@cs.wisc.edu
Elisa Heymann
Elisa.Heymann@uab.es
http://www.cs.wisc.edu/mist/
